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1. Flanagan v. People, 52 N.Y. 467, 469 (1873).
2. Christy v. Clarke, 45 Barb. 529, 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1866) (citation omitted).
Variations on the term “‘sound and disposing mind’” were treated by courts throughout the
country as “equivalent to the term ‘sanity.’”  Yoe v. McCord, 74 Ill. 33, 40-41 (1874).  This was
consistent with English law and usage since the time of Coke.  Id.
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In cases decided seven years apart, in 1866 and 1873, courts in New York
applied two distinct legal definitions of sanity to two different types of cases.
According to one, “the test of responsibility for criminal acts, where
unsoundness of mind is interposed as a defence, is the capacity of the
defendant to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of and with
respect to the act which is the subject of the inquiry.”   According to the other,1
the sound and disposing mind of a testator “is a mind and memory which has
the capacity of recollecting, discerning, and feeling the relations, connections,
and obligations of family and blood.”2
One of these definitions required only soundness of the intellect in order to
constitute a sane and responsible person.  The other required also soundness
of the sentiments.  By their terms, these definitions allowed for the
determination that the same person at the same moment was fully competent
and responsible in the eyes of the criminal law, but less than fully competent
and responsible to execute a will.  These two different definitions of sanity, or
insanity, reflected the general development of the common law in the United
States up to that time.
How could the same individual at the same time be both sane and insane,
competent and incompetent, a person and less than a person, in the eyes of the
law?  Why did the definition of the sane and responsible person differ in
different areas of law, and for different purposes within the law?  Physician
and attorney John Ordronaux, after his appointment as the first New York
State Commissioner in Lunacy, recognized in 1878 that “[w]hat constitutes
mental capacity at law is a question to be ultimately determined as much by
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3. JOHN ORDRONAUX, COMMENTARIES ON THE LUNACY LAWS OF NEW YORK, AND ON THE
JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF INSANITY AT COMMON LAW AND IN EQUITY, INCLUDING PROCEDURE, AS
EXPOUNDED IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 356 (Albany, John D. Parsons, Jr. 1878).
4. Id. at 360; see also In re Dunham, 27 Conn. 192, 206 (1858).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See, e.g., In re Dunham, 27 Conn. 192.
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. See, e.g., In re Dunham, 27 Conn. 192; see also ORDRONAUX, supra note 3, at 360.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See infra Part III.
the character of the act as by the state of mind of the actor.”   It was clear, too,3
that legally competent personhood was not the same as normative personhood.
One could be an eccentric, a monomaniac, or an imbecile and still be
sufficiently a person to be fully competent in the eyes of the law to perform
some acts of legal significance.  On the other hand, one might merely suffer
from misdirected affections and so be disabled from executing a will.  Indeed,
as Ordronaux noted, “wills have been found void where the testator would not,
if living, have been found insane.”4
This article examines the meanings of insanity in two areas of nineteenth
century American law: homicide prosecutions and will contests.  These
represent the most extreme ends of the continuum of insanity law.  Insanity
was most difficult to establish in homicide prosecutions, in part because of the
narrow definition of insanity applied in such cases.   On the other hand,5
insanity was relatively easy to establish in will contests.   In that context6
insanity included, as a practical matter, any unsoundness of mind that affected
the testator’s sentiments concerning the natural objects of his or her bounty.7
It surely included many persons who, if prosecuted for homicide during their
lifetimes, would have had no hope of acquittal on grounds of insanity.8
This article first summarizes the historiography of nineteenth century
thought concerning insanity.   It then reviews the forward-looking opinions of9
Charles Doe, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, on the
issue of insanity in the law.  While these found little contemporary following,10
they link the two primary topics of this article, and provide a conceptual
counterweight to the opinions of other common law courts.  The article then
explains the importance of faculty psychology in nineteenth century legal and
cultural understandings of the nature of the human mind.   It then describes11
the traditional common law rule applied in cases of criminal responsibility,
reforms of that rule proposed by Isaac Ray and others, their rejection in the
famous M’Naghten case, and their mixed reception in American state courts
in cases of criminal insanity.   The standard of insanity in will contests is then12
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss3/2
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13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Parts IV.A-B.
15. Led by Gerald N. Grob, these authors have documented a story of decline from the
optimism of the antebellum asylum movement to the dreary and sometimes abusive
custodialism of the later century.  See generally NORMAN DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1789-1865 (1964); ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY OF THEIR CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES (2d ed. 1949); GERALD N.
GROB, MENTAL ILLNESS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 1875-1940 (1983); GERALD N. GROB,
MENTAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA: SOCIAL POLICY TO 1875 (1973); CONSTANCE M.
MCGOVERN, MASTERS OF MADNESS: SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
PROFESSION (1985); ANDREW SCULL, MADHOUSE: A TRAGIC TALE OF MEGALOMANIA AND
MODERN MEDICINE (2005).  For a history of the asylum movement in Great Britain, see
ANDREW SCULL, THE MOST SOLITARY AFFLICTIONS: MADNESS AND SOCIETY IN BRITAIN, 1700-
1900 (1993).
16. This literature generally recounts a series of salutary developments by which cultural
authority over mental illness shifted from ministers and theologians to phrenologists, and then
to neurologists, and finally, at century’s end, to psychoanalysts. This coincided with the
evolution of conceptions of the causes of mental illness, from early superstitions concerning
demonic possession, to the more forgiving but still essentially theological idea of insanity as
otherwise inexplicable “duress of heaven,” to the early organicist theories based upon a sort of
geography of the brain, to the neurasthenic model of nervous exhaustion, and finally to the
redemptive, if difficult, truths of psychoanalysis.  See JOHN C. BURNHAM, PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND AMERICAN MEDICINE: 1984-1918 (1967); HENRI ELLENBERGER, THE DISCOVERY OF THE
UNCONSCIOUS: THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF DYNAMIC PSYCHIATRY (1970); F.G. GOSLING,
BEFORE FREUD: NEURASTHENIA AND THE AMERICAN MEDICAL COMMUNITY, 1870-1910 (1987);
NATHAN G. HALE, JR., FREUD AND THE AMERICANS: THE BEGINNINGS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1876-1917 (1971); BARBARA SICHERMAN, THE QUEST FOR MENTAL
HEALTH IN AMERICA, 1880-1917 (1980); John Chynoweth Burnham, “Psychiatry, Psychology
and the Progressive Movement,” 12 AM. Q. 457 (1960) [hereinafter Burnham, Progressive
Movement]; Jaques M. Quen, Asylum Psychiatry, Neurology, Social Work and Mental Hygiene:
An Exploratory Study in Interprofessional History, 29 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCI. 93 (1974).  The
relatively recent success of Prozac and other psychopharmaceutical bromides has inspired a
postscript to this tale, in which the empirical science underlying such biological therapies
discussed,  and the significance of the phrase “natural objects of [the13
testator’s] bounty,” and its shifting meanings over time, is discussed.   The14
article concludes with a summary of the causes and significance of the
difference in the legal standards of insanity applied by the courts in criminal
cases and in cases of testamentary capacity.
II. Legal Definitions of Insanity in Nineteenth Century America
A. The Historiography of Insanity in Nineteenth Century American Law
The historiography of insanity is divided broadly into three categories.
There is the history of the asylum in America,  the history of the psychiatric15
profession,  and the social history of insanity.   These bodies of literature16 17
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vanquishes the psychoanalytic superstition and its wizard practitioners.  EDWARD SHORTER, A
HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE ERA OF THE ASYLUM TO THE AGE OF PROZAC (1997).
17. Authors in this tradition have capitalized on the fact that, at the margins, insanity is
often difficult to define. They then typically make heroes of the insane, whom they characterize
as wise challengers of hegemonic views of truth and reality.  The inevitable conclusion is that
the means by which insanity is defined and treated is little more than a thinly veiled effort at
social control. The leading contemporary proponents of this view are Thomas Szasz and Michel
Foucault, but its roots lie in Henry Maudsley’s work in the 1870s.  See HENRY MAUDSLEY,
RESPONSIBILITY IN MENTAL DISEASE (authorized ed. 1900).  There is a simple-minded
subversiveness in the literature of this school of thought, and its occasional hagiography of the
insane is unfortunate and unrealistic.  Nevertheless, the conclusion that the definition of insanity
is, at least in part, a matter of social control, certainly resonates with the nineteenth century
medical jurisprudence discussed herein. While it sheds little light on the problem of the truly
mad and dangerous, the social control theory explains a great deal about the management of
persons at the margin of sanity in nineteenth century America.  See MICHEL FOUCAULT,
MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION (Michael Howard trans., 1967); ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS
(1961); ROY PORTER, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MADNESS: THE WORLD THROUGH THE EYES OF
THE INSANE (1987); THOMAS S. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); THOMAS S.
SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970); THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL
ILLNESS (1961).
18. See generally JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1960);
JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA (1993); DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS AND IDLE HUMORS: THE INSANITY
DEFENSE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT (1996); CHARLES ROSENBERG, THE TRIAL OF THE
ASSASSIN GUITEAU (1968); HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE
(1954); Joel R. Cornwell, The Confusion of Causes and Reasons in Forensic Psychology:
Deconstructing Mens Rea and Other Mental Events, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 107 (1999);
Christopher Hawthorne, ‘Deific Decree’: The Short, Happy Life of a Pseudo-Doctrine, 33 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1755 (2000); Herbert Hovenkamp, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility in
Progressive America, 57 N.D. L. REV. 541 (1981); Edwin R. Keedy, Insanity and Criminal
Responsibility, Part 2, 30 HARV. L. REV. 724 (1917); Richard H. Kuh, The Insanity Defense —
An Effort to Combine Law and Reason, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1962); Bailey H. Kuklin, The
Asymmetrical Conditions of Legal Responsibility in the Market Place, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893
(1990); John K. McHenry, The Judicial Evolution of Ohio’s Insanity Defense, 13 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 49 (1987); Richard Lowell Nygaard, On Responsibility: Or, The Insanity of Mental
Defenses and Punishment, 41 VILL. L. REV. 951 (1996); Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond,
The Origins of the “Right and Wrong” Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent
Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1227 (1966); Roscoe
Pound, Insanity & Criminal Responsibility, 2 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 544 (1911);
Allen D. Spiegel & Peter B. Suskind, A Paroxysmal Insanity Plea in an 1865 Murder Trial, 16
J. LEGAL MED. 585 (1995); Janet Ann Tighe, A Question of Responsibility: The Development
of American Forensic Psychiatry, 1838-1930 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Pennsylvania) (on file at the University of Pennsylvania Library).
deal only superficially, if at all, with insanity as a legal problem.  Most of the
scholarly literature addressing insanity and the law has been limited
specifically to the relationship between insanity and the criminal law, which
has received considerable attention from medical and legal scholars.   Their18
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss3/2
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19. GEORGE L. HARRISON, LEGISLATION ON INSANITY 3 (Philadelphia, privately printed
1884).
20. One article in which the sanity of testators was expressly considered is James C. Mohr,
The Paradoxical Advance and Embattled Retreat of the “Unsound Mind”: Evidence of Insanity
and the Adjudication of Wills in Nineteenth-Century America, 24 HIST. REFLECTIONS 415
(1998).
21. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 441-42 (1870); Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.H. 120, 147-
48 (1886) (Doe, J., dissenting).  For a comprehensive discussion of Doe’s life and career, see
JOHN PHILLIP REID, CHIEF JUSTICE: THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF CHARLES DOE (1967).  Doe’s ideas
about insanity are discussed in chapter 8.  Id. at 117-19.
22. 47 N.H. 120, 147-48 (Doe, J., dissenting).
23. 49 N.H. 399, 441-42.
24. See Boardman, 47 N.H. at 120-25 (majority opinion).  Doe’s dissent in this case was
adopted by his own court a few years later in Pike, but no other state court followed its lead.
25. Pike, 49 N.H. at 408, set forth the same rule of insanity as Doe had favored in
Boardman, and applied it in a criminal context.
work has yielded important insights concerning the significance of insanity as
a legal phenomenon in the nineteenth century.
As this article demonstrates, the insanity defense in homicide cases is
inherently too narrow to be representative of broadly held notions of insanity.
The different standards applied to prosecutions and will contests prove at least
that much.  Thus, the existing literature is incomplete.  It pays too little
attention to the role of insanity in civil legal proceedings arising from the
conduct of those to whom George L. Harrison, the President of the Board of
Public Charities in Pennsylvania, referred as the “defective classes of the
commonwealth.”   This article is intended to open a broader discussion of the19
role insanity played in nineteenth century American law, and to begin to shed
light on notions of personhood implicit in the various legal definitions of
insanity, starting with these two very different areas of law.20
B. Issues of Fact, Issues of Law: The Opinions of Charles Doe
It might seem odd that insanity should be defined at all in legal literature.
If insanity were considered a medical condition in the nineteenth century, why
would the courts not defer to medical authorities?  Why would they not permit
juries to apply then-current medical definitions of insanity to particular
defendants in criminal cases, and to testators in will contests?  Charles Doe,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, tried to impose just
such a rule.   Doe’s work provides a link between the two areas of law21
discussed in this article.  He wrote two of the most discussed and least
followed opinions in all of insanity jurisprudence; a dissent in Boardman v.
Woodman  in 1866, and the court’s opinion in State v. Pike  in 1870.  The22 23
former was a will contest,  the latter a homicide prosecution.24 25
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26. Id. at 442.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Boardman, 47 N.H. at 150 (Doe, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 147-48.
31. Pike, 49 N.H. at 439.
32. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
Doe preferred to take the jurisprudence out of the medical jurisprudence of
insanity, and leave the issue entirely in the hands of physicians.   He ruled that26
the standard of insanity should never be a legal standard, but must always be
a factual, and hence a medical, standard.   “The whole difficulty is, that courts27
have undertaken to declare that to be law which is a matter of fact.”   He28
insisted “[t]hat cannot be a fact in law, which is not a fact in science; that
cannot be health in law, which is disease in fact.”   He proposed to make the29
issue of insanity a straightforward, if not simple, question of fact:
A product of healthy, infantile immaturity, or of disease of the
mind, is not a contract, a crime, or a will.  The question whether
[the testatrix] had a mental disease was a question of fact for the
jury, and not a question of law for the court. . . . Insanity, other than
the healthy absence of development in infants, is the result of a
certain pathological condition of the brain — a condition in which
the intellectual faculties, or the moral sentiments, or the animal
propensities, have their free action destroyed by disease whether
congenital or acquired; and the tests and symptoms of this disease
are no more matters of law than are the tests or symptoms of any
other disease in animal or vegetable life.30
Doe was aware that the medical definition of insanity was both hotly
contested and evolving rapidly.  On the other hand, the common law,
constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis, evolved slowly.  By adopting as
legal rules psychological standards current at the time of a particular judicial
decision,  courts bound later courts.  Consequently, when later trials were held
and newer psychological theories presented, “the precedents require[d] the jury
to be instructed in the new medical theories by experts, and in the old medical
theories by the judge.”31
No other state followed the New Hampshire rule in the nineteenth century.
In the other states, the courts were simply unwilling to defer such fundamental
issues of competency, responsibility, and personhood to a rival profession.32
They agreed unanimously that the question of insanity was a question of law.
Their insistence that it was the role of the courts to define insanity was one
cause of the conflicts described in this article.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss3/2
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33. JAMES MARK BALDWIN, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY (1889); BURNHAM,
PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 16; ELLENBERGER, supra note 16; THOMAS HILL GREEN,
PROLEGOMENA TO ETHICS (4th ed. 1899); WILLIAM A. GUY, THE FACTORS OF THE UNSOUND
MIND (1881); REUBEN POST HALLECK, PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIC CULTURE 49-51 (1895);
MARK HOPKINS, LECTURES ON MORAL SCIENCE (1865); NOAH PORTER, THE ELEMENTS OF
MORAL SCIENCE (1895); RICHARD RABINOWITZ, THE SPIRITUAL SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF PERSONAL RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW
ENGLAND xxix-xxxi (1989); SICHERMAN, supra note 16; Burnham, Progressive Movement,
supra note 16.  Other commentators divided the mind into more specific parts, but stayed within
the prevailing paradigm.  See, e.g., People v. Kleim, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845);
Banks v. Goodfellow, (1870) 5 L.R.Q.B. 549 (U.K.).
34. ANN DOUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 4-13 (1977); RABINOWITZ,
supra note 33, at chs. 2, 7, & 13.  Rabinowitz is careful to point out that the intellectual,
volitional, and emotional paradigms each persisted throughout the century.  His argument is
simply that, at different times, one predominated over the others.  Douglas’s work has caused
considerable discussion of the importance of domesticity, which is beyond the scope of this
article.  For a representative sample of the historiography of domesticity, see ELIZABETH
BARNES, STATES OF SYMPATHY (1997); MARY KELLEY, PRIVATE WOMAN, PUBLIC STAGE:
LITERARY DOMESTICITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2d ed. 2002); GLENNA
MATTHEWS, JUST A HOUSEWIFE: THE RISE AND FALL OF DOMESTICITY IN AMERICA (1987);
LORA ROMERO, HOME FRONTS: DOMESTICITY AND ITS CRITICS IN THE ANTEBELLUM UNITED
STATES (1997); KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, CATHARINE BEECHER: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
DOMESTICITY (1973); KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION’S WORK
(1995); MADELEINE B. STERN, LOUISA MAY ALCOTT: FROM BLOOD & THUNDER TO HEARTH
& HOME (1998).
C. Intellect, Will, and Sentiment
Nineteenth century American thought about the structure of the human
mind was dominated by the paradigm now known as faculty psychology.
From phrenologists to judges, virtually everyone divided the mind into the
intellect, the will, and the sentiments. The intellect was thought to be the seat
of reason.  It was the faculty which most distinguished human beings from
animals, and thus was thought during the early century to define personhood.
Will, or volition, was the faculty that actualized the work of the intellect.
Sentiments were emotions or feelings. They were despised in certain contexts
for their effusiveness and effeminacy, and valued in others for their
refinement.33
Based on the work of the historians Ann Douglas and Richard Rabinowitz,
it seems clear that in religious doctrine and practice, in middle class domestic
practices and beliefs, and in the literature representing “the cult of
domesticity,” the predominance of the intellect had ended by the 1840s.  The
other two faculties dominated in those areas of culture throughout the
remainder of the century.   The predominance of will and sentiment is34
addressed together herein under the general rubric of sentimentalism, without
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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35. See generally MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA
COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790-1865 (1981).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 146-50, 185.
38. See infra Part IV.
39. PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA (1997); see also Alfred L. Brophy, Reason and Sentiment: The Moral Worlds and
Modes of Reasoning of Antebellum Jurists, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1161 (1999).  Karsten complicates
Perry Miller’s suggestion that there was a difference between legal reasoning and theological
reasoning.  He identifies a conflict within the legal profession itself, pitting the reform-oriented
jurisprudence of the heart against the intellectually and logically sound jurisprudence of the
head.  See PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH
THE CIVIL WAR (1965).  Karsten’s greatest contribution is to remind us that there was more to
nineteenth century law than the simple economic instrumentalism offered as the universal
explanatory solvent by the Horwitz school.  See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
40. KARSTEN, supra note 39, at 312-24.
delving into the subtle distinctions between them.  There is broad agreement
that the rise of sentimentalism, the cult of domesticity, and the modern,
emotionally supportive, middle-class family coincided.   These were35
characterized, in part, by the erection and maintenance of clear boundaries
between the family and the community.   The family was defined as the36
nuclear or conjugal family, or some approximation of that institution which
served a similar role in the emotions or sentiments of the family member.37
The importance of this development in the law of will contests is discussed
later herein.38
While sentimentalism triumphed among the clergy and among middle-class
women, the struggle among the mental faculties for predominance in the law
had a more ambiguous outcome.  The legal historian Peter Karsten
characterizes the development of law in this period as a metaphorical conflict
between the jurisprudence of the “head,” unquestionably dominant in the early
century, and the jurisprudence of the “heart,” which influenced the law to
some extent as the century progressed.   As Karsten describes it, the marginal39
successes of the jurisprudence of the heart resulted, at least in part, from
religious imperatives felt by some members of the judiciary, and to that extent
are related to the rise of sentimentalism described by Douglas and
Rabinowitz.40
Taken together, the work of all these historians leaves little doubt that the
struggle between the rigorous intellectualism of the early century and the later
forces of reform and sentimentalism took place in the law, as it had in theology
and in the broader culture.  But the outcomes were quite different.  Judges and
legal scholars cleaved more tightly to reason and resisted the use of sentiment
as a dispositive or guiding principle.  As the contrast between the criminal and
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss3/2
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41. DOUGLAS, supra note 34, 4-13, 88-97.  The historian Michael Grossberg has
documented this trend inasmuch as it characterized the law of domestic relations — those laws
that governed relations between spouses and between parents and children. MICHAEL
GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1985).  The developments Grossberg describes are consistent with the trends
described by Douglas, and with the particular developments noted herein.
42. See State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 438 (1870); see also ROSENBERG, supra note 18; United
States v. Guiteau, 12 D.C. (1 Mackey) 498, 546-50 (D.C. 1882); Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. 161
(S.D.N.Y. 1882).
43. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
44. See infra Parts III.B-C.
45. See infra Part III.C.
46. See infra Part IV.A.
civil laws of insanity illustrates, judges admitted sentimental standards only at
the margins of legal doctrine and practice.  Douglas would not be surprised to
learn that sentiment became a strong influence on the law only in contexts in
which legal doctrine impacted directly upon normative notions of domesticity
— the same interests served by sentimental theology.   Even so, for the most41
part the heart won the battle among the clergy, but the head won the battle
among the jurists.
The reason for the law’s failure to follow the path of theology appears to be
that lawyers and judges rejected the sentimentalizing influences that guided the
development of religious and popular literature in the nineteenth century.  The
other learned professions of the period, law and medicine, marginalized those
factions within their own ranks that pushed in the direction of incorporating
sentimental standards into various legal and medical measures, dismissing
them as mere “sentimental philosophers.”   The effect was to create a greater42
distance between legal and medical “culture” and popular culture, and also to
harden the dominant tendencies in both professions with respect to the insane.
As religious and popular literature increasingly adopted a sentimental
posture,  legal and medical writers reacted not only by rejecting43
sentimentalism,  but by rejecting the volitional standards around which moral44
reform was centered.  They clung to the same strict intellectualism which had
characterized the literature of all the learned professions in the early century.
This was reflected in the intellectual standard of insanity applied in homicide
cases.45
The clearest exception to this reaction arose in the manner in which insanity
was adjudicated in cases involving will contests.  In that limited realm,
medical jurisprudence adopted a standard of insanity which incorporated and
enforced sentimental notions of domesticity. “Unnatural” sentiments were,
under certain circumstances, classified as a form of insanity in challenges to
wills.  This was accomplished by incorporating in the legal measure of sanity46
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47. See infra Part IV.A.
48. See infra Part IV.A.
49. See infra Part IV.A.
50. A. HIGHMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IDIOCY AND LUNACY 1-5, 128-39, 205-21
(photo. reprint 1979) (1807); JOHN BRYDALL, NON COMPOS MENTIS 33-34, 74-86, 107, 113-15
(photo. reprint 1979) (1700).
51. CHARLES BACKUS, THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF REGENERATION CONSIDERED, IN SIX
DISCOURSES 17 (1800), quoted in RABINOWITZ, supra note 33, at 21.
52. Id.
53. 25 F. Cas. 454 (C.C.D.D.C. 1818) (No. 14,811).
the testator’s ability to recognize and provide for the natural objects of his or
her bounty.   In that context, the phrase “natural objects” presumptively47
included the members of one’s conjugal family or, in the alternative, the
family group that provided for that testator the emotional support expected
from a proper conjugal family.   This was reflected in the sentimental standard48
of insanity applied in will contests.49
III. Insanity and Responsibility in Homicide Cases
A. The Traditional Standard of Insanity
The history of the insanity defense in nineteenth century homicide cases is
one of reform and successful counter-reform.  After much analysis and hand-
wringing, the century ended with a majority rule similar to the rule it began
with, a rule imposing responsibility on all except those suffering from a
disorder of the intellect.
In the legal literature of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, one
lacking this faculty was insane, and incompetent to perform any act of legal
significance.  As early as 1700 the English courts had applied an intellectual
standard of legal responsibility, holding that the loss of reason or
understanding would excuse a crime and void an otherwise lawful act.   The50
same rule prevailed in the United States, where the intellectual standard of
insanity was explained to juries in a manner so simple as to reflect a broad
acceptance.  The assumptions underlying this standard were the same as those
underlying religious views of the nature of the human mind.   In 1800 the51
Connecticut minister Charles Backus wrote: “All men, whether good or bad,
are capable of distinguishing between holiness and sin, and of knowing their
duty.  This faculty is called The Understanding.”   One who lacked this52
faculty was therefore considered less than a man and less than a person.
This assumption was so widely shared that it rarely received detailed and
precise explanation.  Even in jury charges, little explanation was thought
necessary.  An example is found in United States v. Clarke,  in which Chief53
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Judge William Cranch instructed the jury that the defendant was not
responsible if he “was in such a state of mental insanity, not produced by the
immediate effects of intoxicating drink, as not to have been conscious of the
moral turpitude of the act.”   Other jurists offered more or less precise54
definitions of insanity as it related to criminal responsibility.  As early as 1806
an insane criminal defendant was described, in language that echoed Backus,
as “a person whose understanding is lost.”   Likewise, in an admiralty case55
Mr. Justice Story acquitted a ship’s captain of murder on the grounds of
insanity, and explained his decision as follows:
In general, insanity is an excuse for the commission of every crime,
because the party has not the possession of that reason, which
includes responsibility. . . . [H]uman tribunals are generally
restricted from punishing [such acts], since they are not the acts of
a reasonable being. . . . [S]uch insanity has always been deemed a
sufficient excuse for any crime done under its influence.56
Because of the judicial consensus on the meaning of insanity, there was simply
no need to have a more detailed definition of insanity during the first third of
the nineteenth century. 
Even in the case of Richard Lawrence, who attempted to assassinate
President Andrew Jackson, there was no dispute as to the meaning of
insanity.   Perhaps this was because Lawrence was so obviously insane, and57
there was no indication that he was feigning his illness.  Lawrence believed
himself to be the King of England, and was offended by the United States’
independence and Jackson’s pretensions to authority.   On January 30, 183558
he attempted to shoot Jackson at close range with two pistols, both of which
misfired.   In one of the many legal proceedings arising from this incident,59
Chief Judge Cranch observed that, “[i]t is a very nice point to decide what
degree of insanity will render a person irresponsible for his acts; and it is the
peculiar province of the jury to say whether the prisoner’s insanity is of that
degree.”  Apparently, Cranch thought that the jury needed no further60
instruction to decide the case.  Lawrence was acquitted.61
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Jurists in the early nineteenth century were comfortable with a standard of
insanity based upon the intellect.  This understanding fit perfectly with the
prevailing view that the common law was reason itself.  Judges fancied an
identity, or at least a relationship of genus and species, between reason and the
common law.  They routinely echoed Lord Coke when they proclaimed the
common law “the perfection of human reason.”   The idea excited judges to62
dizzying heights of bombast, as when the Supreme Court of the Republic of
Texas gushed that the common law is a “science, which has been justly called
the perfection of ‘human reason,’ and the maxims and rules of which
constitute the most stupendous fabric of intellectual grandeur ever reared by
the mind of man.”63
The common law, based on reason, assumed a standard of legal
responsibility based on reason.  The judges were quite comfortable assuming
that their understanding of insanity as the absence of reason was so widely
shared that no explicit legal definition was required.  This assumption was
further reflected in legal rules that permitted the jury to decide the issue based
upon the observations and opinions of ordinary persons without medical
training.   Lay witnesses were permitted to testify, and jurors were permitted64
to draw their own conclusions from the witnesses’ observations, and from the
jurors’ own.   The instructions judges gave to juries sometimes illustrated65
both of these points.  For example, in Bennett v. State  the Tennessee Supreme66
Court approved the following instruction, which the trial court had given to the
jury:
[U]pon the subject of derangement, such was the structure of the
human mind, that philosophers might forever speculate upon the
subject, but could not define in what it consists; but that if a
hundred men should look at a drunken man, they would agree in
saying he was drunk; and if a hundred men were to look at a
deranged man, they would agree in saying he was deranged.67
This standard of common understanding was explained in greater detail by the
appellate court.
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We take the charge to import that there is an intuitive principle in
our nature which, when combined with our experience, qualifies
men to judge what is drunkenness and what insanity, although the
reasons why the mind is insane can not be defined in theory.  That
if a man was [sic] solely deranged, or solely drunk, a hundred men
would all agree his mind was affected in the one way or the other,
and that this judgment formed upon observation would be the better
test of the fact.68
Strict and clear definitions were not needed, because the idea was widely
shared and required little elaboration. The historical record establishes quite
clearly that, in the early nineteenth century, there was broad agreement as to
the definition of insanity, and the standard was one of intellectual impairment.
B. The Roots of Reform
It was only later, when the reform movement created alternatives, that
judges felt compelled to articulate their doctrinal positions explicitly in all
cases.  Beginning in the 1820s, signs of change began to appear in religious as
well as legal literature.  The evangelist and theologian Lyman Beecher
understood human responsibility in the terms of faculty psychology, but added
a new ingredient to Backus’s strictly intellectual concept.  Like the other
reformers, Beecher combined perception and understanding under the rubric
of the intellectual faculty.  But he added another requirement before an
individual could be held responsible:
To accountability in the subjects are requisite, understanding to
perceive the rule of action; conscience to feel moral obligation; and
the faculty of choice in the view of motives.  Understanding to
perceive the rule of action does not constitute accountable agency.
Choice without the capacity of feeling obligation, does not
constitute accountable agency.  But the faculty of understanding,
and conscience, and choice, united, do constitute an accountable
agent.  The laws of God and man recognise these properties of
mind, as the foundation of accountability.69
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72. Overholser, supra note 71, at vii.
73. RAY, supra note 71, at 46.
74. Id. at 58.
Beecher was clearly wrong with respect to the “laws of man.”  But his
incorporation of volition, which he called choice, into the concept of
responsibility, which he called accountability,  distinguished his definition of70
the fully competent and responsible person from Backus’s definition.
Opinions such as Beecher’s reflected a changing viewpoint that also appeared
in legal literature.  Its place in the law, however, would not be resolved in New
York and most of the other states until the last quarter of the century.
Reform efforts specifically directed toward legal rules began with the
publication in 1838 of Isaac Ray’s treatise on the subject,  which had71
considerable influence among American as well as English judges.   Ray72
believed firmly in the organic origin of mental disease.  “[M]adness,” he
wrote, “is the result of a certain pathological condition of the brain.”   He73
believed that the pathology of any faculty could be characterized as insanity,
for legal purposes, because all such pathologies arose from organic disease
over which the victim had no control.  He confidently maintained that:
[i]t is an undoubted truth that the manifestations of the intellect,
and those of the sentiments, propensities, and passions, or generally
of the intellectual and affective powers are connected with and
dependent upon the brain.  It follows, then, as a corollary, that
abnormal conditions of these powers are equally connected with
abnormal conditions of the brain.74
An understanding of the difference between right and wrong, in Ray’s view,
was simply not enough to establish sanity and legal responsibility for crime.
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Ray’s observations of the insane led to his conclusion that they frequently
displayed a subtle understanding of matters of logic and morals.
In no school of logic, in no assembly of the just, can we listen to
closer and shrewder argumentation, to warmer exhortations to duty,
to more glowing descriptions of the beauty of virtue, or more
indignant denunciations of evil-doing, than in the hospitals and
asylums for the insane. . . . The particular criminal act, however,
becomes divorced in their minds from its relations to crime in the
abstract.75
Thus, in Ray’s view, many insane persons in fact had a heightened ability to
distinguish right from wrong in general, but virtually no ability to apply the
distinction to their own conduct.  Therein lay the proof of their insanity.
Ray rejected the legal definition of insanity with open contempt:
It is a fact, not calculated to increase our faith in the march of
intellect, that the very trait peculiarly characteristic of insanity has
been seized upon as conclusive proof of sanity in doubtful cases;
and thus the infirmity that entitles one to protection is tortured into
a good and sufficient reason for completing his ruin.76
Some judges and legal commentators harbored a reciprocal contempt for Ray.
They ridiculed him and those who agreed with him as “visionary theorists and
sentimental philosophers.”   Even so, many judges and physicians, influenced77
by Ray and by the many moral reform movements of the era, began to believe
that defects in the volitional faculty might be as disabling, both medically and
legally, as defects in the intellectual faculty.78
C. M’Naghten: The Rejection of Reform
 In 1842 Daniel M’Naghten’s  paranoid delusions overcame him and led79
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him to attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Sir Robert
Peel.   M’Naghten mistakenly killed Peel’s private secretary, Edward80
Drummond.  There was no dispute that M’Naghten committed the act; the sole
issue was his sanity.   His trial in January of 1843 was initially framed as a81
contest between the intellectual and volitional standards of insanity.  In his
opening statement, the Solicitor General defined insanity in terms of the
intellect: whether M’Naghten “was incapable of distinguishing between right
and wrong.”   He asserted:82
To excuse him it will not be sufficient that he laboured under
partial insanity upon some subjects — that he had a morbid
delusion of mind upon some subjects, which could not exist in a
wholly sane person; that is not enough, if he had that degree of
intellect which enabled him to know and distinguish between right
and wrong . . . .83
The barristers who defended him relied heavily on Ray’s treatise, even reading
a portion of it into the trial record.   Their strategy, as revealed in Mr.84
Cockburn’s opening statement, was clearly to persuade the jury that
M’Naghten was insane by virtue of a volitional, rather than an intellectual,
defect.   Cockburn explained the role of the will in human nature: “by will,85
with reference to human action, must be understood the necessary moral sense
that guides and directs the volition.”   He referred repeatedly to the will or86
volitional faculty as a determinant of sanity.   M’Naghten’s counsel offered87
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the testimony of Dr. E. R. Monro, who testified that M’Naghten was insane:
“The act with which he is charged, coupled with the history of his past life,
leaves not the remotest doubt on [sic] my mind of the presence of insanity
sufficient to deprive the prisoner of all self-control.”   Two other physicians88
agreed,  and the Solicitor General stated to the court that he had no contrary89
evidence to offer.   Chief Justice Tindal, with the consent of the other two90
judges, “stop[ped] the case.”91
For the court to do so, without objection by the Solicitor General, was
tantamount to an expansion of the legal definition of insanity to include the
volitional standard.  As John Singleton, the Lord Chancellor, noted in a debate
in the House of Lords, this “created a deep sensation amongst your Lordships,
and also in the public mind.”   The Lords’ debates over M’Naghten reveal92
their concern not only about the acquittal, but also about the rule of law
effectively applied in the case.93
Lord Brougham suggested that legislation might be needed to address the
issue.   A similar suggestion was made on the floor of the House of94
Commons.   Another Member requested a change in House rules to permit95
him to propose a bill for expedited consideration, under which the insanity
defense would be abolished, “except where it can be proved that the person
accused was publicly known and reputed to be a maniac.”96
The Lords were careful not to criticize the outcome or the procedure, but
decided to summon the judges of common pleas before them to explain in
detailed and precise language the law of insanity in criminal cases.   It97
concerned Lord Brougham in particular that judges had not used the same
language to describe the test in all cases, but had used, at various times, four
different phrases to describe the standard.   He observed that “[e]very one of98
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them [was] more vague, more uncertain, less easily acted upon than the
original one of right and wrong.”   Throughout their discussion of the various99
standards, however, they never endorsed a volitional standard of insanity.
With the threat of legislation hanging over the justices’ heads, it is hardly
surprising that the standard they announced was limited to intellectual defects,
and included no language that might be taken for a volitional standard.100
Thus, what has come to be known as the M’Naghten rule ought more properly
be called the rule to prevent the M’Naghten result.  It was the first, and clearly
the most successful and enduring, backlash against the reform of criminal
insanity rules.
The M’Naghten rule was strictly limited to intellectual insanity.  It
contemplated relief from criminal responsibility in the event of certain
impairments of the intellectual faculty, but not the volitional or emotional
faculties.  Lord Chief Justice Tindal stated the rule as follows:
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong.101
Thus the M’Naghten rule represented the rejection of an American reform
by an English court.  It was a return to an earlier rule.  This fact has eluded
many leading historians, including the enormously influential Lawrence
Friedman, who wrote:
The most important legal definition of insanity was the so-called
right-or-wrong test.  It was formulated by an English Court in
1843. . . . This famous formulation, quite obviously, stressed
cognition, the act of knowing. . . . [I]t became standard in the
United States as well.102
In fact, as discussed earlier herein, the essential features of the test predated
M’Naghten, and were already in effect in the American states, as well as in
England prior to M’Naghten.   The opinion of the English justices rejected103
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reform of the English rule.  It remained to be seen whether the reforms
advocated by Ray and others would be adopted in the American states.  That
would not be settled for several decades.
D. The M’Naghten Rule in American Law
The M’Naghten opinion itself was first discussed in the American
jurisprudence in Commonwealth v. Rogers,  which was tried before Chief104
Justice Lemuel Shaw, two associate justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, and a jury, in March Term of 1844.   Chief Justice Shaw105
included the language of the M’Naghten rule in his instructions to the jury,106
and cited the answers given by the judges of Common Pleas to the questions
posed by the House of Lords.   But, being the reformer he often was,  he107 108
complicated the intellectual standard endorsed by the English court with a
clearly volitional standard.   Chief Justice Shaw cited no authority for this109
addition to the rule, but by its terms it showed clear signs of Ray’s influence.110
Chief Justice Shaw wrote as follows: 
In order to constitute a crime, a person must have intelligence and
capacity enough to have a criminal intent and purpose; and if his
reason and mental powers are either so deficient that he has no will,
no conscience or controlling mental power, or if, through the
overwhelming violence of mental disease, his intellectual power is
for the time obliterated, he is not a responsible moral agent, and is
not punishable for criminal acts.  But these are extremes easily
distinguished, and not to be mistaken.  The difficulty lies between
these extremes, in the cases of partial insanity, where the mind may
be clouded and weakened, but not incapable of remembering,
reasoning  and judging, or so perverted by insane delusion, as to act
under false impressions and influences.  In these cases, the rule of
law, as we understand it, is this:  A man is not to be excused from
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responsibility, if he has capacity and reason sufficient to enable him
to distinguish between right and wrong, as to the particular act he
is then doing; a knowledge and consciousness that the act he is
doing is wrong and criminal, and will subject him to punishment.111
By his carefully chosen language, Chief Justice Shaw appears to have
created two discrete rules.   The first applied to persons whose intellects or112
wills were “obliterated” by insanity.   Those persons would be relieved of113
legal responsibility under either an intellectual or a volitional test.   Perhaps,114
in Chief Justice Shaw’s view, there was little sense in scrutinizing the matter
too closely when the subject was obviously and severely insane.
Where insanity was only partial, and thus less severe and obvious, the
second rule applied.   Such persons would be relieved of legal responsibility115
only under an intellectual test.   But even the intellectual test was somewhat116
modified, reflecting Ray’s thinking.  Chief Justice Shaw’s definition of
insanity required not merely an abstract understanding of the wrongfulness of
a crime of the sort at issue, but a specific understanding that the defendant’s
own act had been wrongful.   Despite the confusing duality of Chief Justice117
Shaw’s rule, there is no question that Chief Justice Shaw rejected the
traditional intellectual test reinstated by the English court and instead, adopted
a volitional standard.   This is consistent with Ray’s work, and is also118
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consistent, both in its import and its timing, with the reform-oriented and
volition-oriented theology of the day.  119
The next year, in 1845, the New York Supreme Court of Judicature applied
a definition of insanity in a homicide case that included both an intellectual
test and a volitional test.   On December 22, 1844, Andrew Kleim locked120
young Catharine Hanlin in a shack with her two children, and set the shack on
fire.   When the three tried to escape Kleim drove them back inside by121
stabbing the mother.   Neighbors finally rescued the three victims, but the122
mother died the following day.123
Justice John W. Edmonds’s charge to the jury reflected his careful thinking
on insanity.  He noted that insanity was once defined in the law as only “an
overthrow of the intellect.”   In that backward era, according to Justice124
Edmonds, the insanity defense protected only those who suffered from
intellectual insanity.   But now, according to this thoughtful jurist,125
[a]s science and the knowledge of the disease [of insanity]
progressed . . . the rule has been extended in modern times until it
begins to comprehend within its saving influences most of those
who by the visitation of disease are deprived of the power of self-
government.  Yet the law, in its slow and cautious progress, still
lags far behind the advance of true knowledge.126
Borrowing language liberally from the M’Naghten and Rogers cases, both of
which he cited, Justice Edmonds announced a legal test of insanity that
relieved criminal defendants of responsibility based upon either an intellectual
or a volitional defect.   Andrew Kleim was acquitted on the grounds of127
insanity, and Justice Edmonds ordered him committed to a state lunatic
asylum.  128
In a postscript to his opinion, written after 1866, Justice Edmonds noted that
Kleim “remained a few years in the asylum, and died there, his disease having
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129. Id.
130. Id. at 35 (quotation omitted).  Compare Chief Judge Cockburn’s opinion in Banks v.
Goodfellow:
[W]hatever may be [the human mind’s] essence, everyone must be conscious that
the faculties and [f]unctions of the mind are various and distinct, as are the powers
and functions of our physical organisation.  The instincts, the affections, the
passions, the moral sense, perception, thought, reason, imagination, memory, are
so many distinct faculties or functions of the mind.  The pathology of mental
disease and the experience of insanity in its various forms teach us that while on
the one hand all the faculties, moral and intellectual, may be involved in one
common ruin, as in the case of the raving maniac, one or more only of these
faculties or functions may be disordered, while the rest are left unimpaired and
undisturbed.
(1870) 5 L.R.Q.B. 549 (U.K.).  Cockburn had been the lead defense attorney in M’Naghten.
The Queen v. M’Naughton, (1843) 4 Reports of State Trials 847, 849 (Central. Cr. Ct.).
131. The next reported case, in chronological order, was important more for the cast of
characters involved than for the rule of law applied.  Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1847) arose in 1847 when a free black man was accused of murdering a prominent white
steadily grown worse until he became a mere driveling idiot.”   In the same129
postscript, Justice Edmonds set forth his theory of sanity:
A sane man is one — 1. Whose senses bear truthful evidence.  2.
Whose understanding is capable of receiving that evidence.  3.
Whose reason can draw proper conclusions from the truthful
evidence thus received.  4. Whose will can guide the thought thus
obtained.  5. Whose moral sense can tell the right and wrong of any
act growing out of that thought.  6. And whose act can, at his own
pleasure, be in conformity with the action of all these qualities.  All
these things unite to make sanity.  The absence of any one of them
makes insanity.130
This apparently more elaborate test can be reduced to a simple test of intellect
and volition.  The first, second, third, and fifth factors set forth what were at
that time considered aspects of the intellect.  The fourth and sixth factors are
aspects of the will.  Under Justice Edmonds’s view, even a partial defect in
either faculty would be sufficient to absolve one of criminal responsibility.
Implicitly, a partial defect in either faculty would also render the sufferer less
than a person, at least in a legal sense.  In the estimation of so thoughtful a
contemporary observer as Justice John Edmonds, personhood was inherently
fractured and extraordinarily fragile.
With the Kleim case it appeared that New York, a leading state in the
development of the common law in the United States, had adopted Ray’s
reforms.  In fact, it was only the beginning of a long battle in the New York
state courts over the volitional test for insanity.   The very next year Justice131
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merchant and his family in rural Cayuga County.  EARL CONRAD, MR. SEWARD FOR THE
DEFENSE 31-42 (1956).  At the time, there was little doubt that Freeman had committed the
killings, and the historical record gives no reason to doubt his guilt.  Id.  William H. Seward
defended the accused.  Id. at 100.  Seward was unable to persuade the jury that Freeman was
insane when he committed the crimes, and he was sentenced to hang.  Id. at 285-89.  On appeal
Seward persuaded the state Supreme Court that Freeman had been insane at the time of trial,
and therefore incapable of assisting in his own defense.  Freeman, 4 Denio at 41.  The court
reversed the conviction without reaching the issue of Freeman’s sanity at the time of the crime.
For a painstakingly literal recounting of the story, based primarily upon the transcript of the
trial, see CONRAD, supra.
132. People v. Divine, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 594 (N.Y. 1848).
133. Id. at 594-95.
134. Id. at 594.
135. Id. at 594-95.
136. Id. at 606; see also M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L.).
137. Divine, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. at 606.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 611.
140. Id.
141. Willis v. People, 32 N.Y. 715, 715 (1865).
Edmonds was again faced with a brutal murder and an insane defendant.132
Joel Divine was a strange man, with a history of controversy and odd
behavior.   He owned a large farm in the Poughkeepsie area, and had a133
longstanding dispute with his neighbor, one Mr. Newcomb, concerning an
easement Divine claimed over a portion of Newcomb’s farm.   On May 25,134
1848, Divine found Richard Wall, Newcomb’s hired laborer, erecting a fence
across the disputed easement, and shot Wall in the head.135
Justice Edmonds had refined and developed his views somewhat since his
decision in Kleim.  His instruction to the jury on the insanity standard began
with a direct quote from M'Naghten setting forth the intellectual test.   But136
Edmonds’s standard was broader.  It was based on his notion of “dispossession
of the free and natural agency of the human mind,” and this fundamental
“mind” included the will.   Edmonds’s meaning was quite clear when he137
wrote the following: “If some controlling disease was in truth the acting power
within him [the defendant] which he could not resist, or if he had not a
sufficient use of his reason to control the passions which prompted the act, he
is not responsible.”   The jury could not agree on a verdict, and Justice138
Edmonds declared a mistrial.   Before a new trial could be held, Divine139
committed suicide.140
After the Divine case, the New York courts did not publish an opinion on
the insanity defense in a criminal case for several years.  Then, late in 1862,
William Willis, a discharged Union Army veteran, returned to his home in
rural Ulster County to find his fiancé married to another man.   Willis’s141
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143. Id. at 715-16.
144. Id. at 716.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 715.
147. Id. at 716.
148. Id. at 715.
149. 31 N.Y. 330 (1865).
150. Id. at 337.
151. Cole’s Trial, 7 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 321 (Albany Oyer and Terminer, 1868).
152. Id. at 331.
153. Id. at 326-27.
fiancé apparently broke her engagement to Willis after learning of his drinking
problem.   On April 9 of the next year he stabbed his former betrothed to142
death in her home.   Covered with her blood, and still holding the knife,143
Willis then walked to her husband’s shop and accused him of the murder.144
Ultimately he admitted he had done it, but pleaded insanity as a defense.145
Willis was convicted in the Ulster County Court of Oyer and Terminer, and the
judgment was affirmed in the New York Supreme Court.   On further appeal,146
the Court of Appeals went to some pains to note that Willis had “an average
amount of sense and intelligence, but a somewhat conceited and eccentric
disposition.”   His “irritable temper and excitable disposition,” however,147
were not evidence of insanity.   148
Then, in another homicide case decided the same year, the New York Court
of Appeals appeared to apply both the intellectual and the volitional standard.
In Kenny v. People  the court ruled that the defendant had failed to prove that149
he “was not capable of reasoning, or competent to control his will.”   The150
statement was not strictly necessary to the court’s decision, but it must have
contributed to the confusion in the lower courts over the applicability of the
volitional standard of insanity in criminal cases.
The issue reappeared in an Albany trial court in 1868.   General George151
W. Cole had done “honorable service” in the Union Army, and had “received
a severe and crushing injury, followed by other injuries thereafter, from the
effects of which he ha[d] not yet fully recovered” by the time of his trial.152
Early in June of 1867 he discovered that his wife was having an affair with L.
Harris Hiscock, encountered Hiscock in public, and shot him dead.   At trial,153
the judge applied both the intellectual standard and a volitional standard:
Was he moved to the commission of this act by the sudden access
[to the victim] and irresistible pressure of excited and
overwhelming passion, roused by the sudden and unexpected sight
of the destroyer of his domestic peace, or him whom he supposed
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154. Id. at 329.
155. Id. at 347.  The historian Robert M. Ireland has argued that the Cole verdict was an
example of the application of what he calls an “unwritten law” reflecting a high Victorian
notion that a murdered scoundrel such as Hiscock got what he deserved, and that the killing was
justified.  Robert M. Ireland, Insanity and the Unwritten Law, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 157
(1988).  He explains in this manner a number of incidents in which cuckolded husbands or the
brothers of dishonored women were acquitted of murdering the scoundrels involved, generally
on the grounds of temporary insanity.  Id.
156. 52 N.Y. 467 (1873).
157. Id. at 469-70.  This rule persisted into the next century.  See, e.g., People v. Schmidt,
329 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915).
to be such — the defiler of his marriage bed — the seducer of the
dearest object of his affections — dethroning his reason, and
pressing him on to the commission of this act, under the influence
of an ungovernable frenzy, unsettling for the time his faculties, and
enthroning insanity in their place?154
It is hardly surprising that the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, and there
is no indication that Cole was committed to an asylum after the verdict.155
The rule in New York was finally settled in 1873, in Flanagan v. The
People,  in which the Court of Appeals took up the issue of the volitional156
standard of insanity directly.  Remarkably, the court characterized the law as
settled and the defense arguments as novel:
[I]t must be regarded as the settled law of this State, that the test of
responsibility for criminal acts, where unsoundness of mind is
interposed as a defense, is the capacity of the defendant to
distinguish between right and wrong at the time of and with respect
to the act which is the subject of the inquiry.  
We are asked in this case to introduce a new element into the
rule of criminal responsibility in cases of alleged insanity, and to
hold that the power of choosing right from wrong is as essential to
legal responsibility as the capacity of distinguishing between them;
and that the absence of the former is consistent with the presence
of the latter.  The argument proceeds upon the theory that there is
a form of insanity in which the faculties are so disordered and
deranged that a man, though he perceives the moral quality of his
acts, is unable to control them, and is urged by some mysterious
pressure to the commission of acts, the consequences of which he
anticipates but cannot avoid.  
Whatever medical or scientific anthority [sic]  there may be for
this view, it has not been accepted by courts of law.157
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158. E.g., Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500 (1844); People v. Divine, 1
Edm. Sel. Cas. 594 (N.Y. 1848); People v. Kleim, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845);
Cole’s Trial, 7 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 321 (Albany Oyer and Terminer, 1868).
159. Flanagan, 52 N.Y. at 469-70.
160. See United States v. McGlue, 26 F. Cas. 1093, 1095 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15, 679;
United States v. Clarke, 25 F. Cas. 454, 454 (C.C.D.D.C. 1818) (No. 14,811); People v. Hoin,
62 Cal. 120 (1882); United States v. Guiteau, 12 D.C. (1 Mackey) 498, 546-50 (D.C. 1882),
aff’g en banc, 10 F. 161 (D.C. 1882); Copeland v. State, 26 So. 319 (Fla. 1899; Humphreys v.
State, 45 Ga. 190, 192 (1872); Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, 472-78 (1860); State v. Lawrence,
57 Me. 574, 576-77 (1870); Spencer v. State, 13 A. 809, 813-14 (Md. 1888); State v. Pagels,
4 S.W. 931, 936-37 (Mo. 1887); State v. Spencer, 21 N.J.L. 196, 201-04 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1846);
State v. Brandon, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 463, 467-68 (1862); State v. Thompson, 1 Wright 617, 621-
22 (Ohio 1834); State v. Alexander, 8 S.E. 440, 441 (S.C. 1889); State v. Bundy, 24 S.C. 439,
444-45 (1886); Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 500, 505 (1854); Leache v. State, 3 S.W. 539, 542 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1886) (citing Carter, 12 Tex. at 500); State v. Harrison, 15 S.E. 982, 986-90 (W. Va.
1892).  Although the Ohio Supreme Court did not cite M’Naghten in its Thompson decision, it
clearly adopted a test limited to intellectual insanity.  See John K. McHenry, The Judicial
Evolution of Ohio’s Insanity Defense, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 49 (1987).
161. Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 124 (Del. 1990); State v. Cole, 45 A. 391, 393-94 (Del.
1899); State v. Windsor, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 512, 538-39 (1854).
162. Boswell v. State, 63 Ala. 307, 316-22 (1879) (using the intellectual test); Parsons v.
State, 2 So. 854, 866-67 (Ala. 1887) (using both the intellectual and volitional tests).
While the court had the final word as a matter of New York law, it was surely
wrong as a matter of history.  As we have seen, the volitional standard of
insanity had in fact been applied in the lower courts in New York and by the
high court in Massachusetts.  But regardless of what had come before,158
Flanagan was the authoritative rejection of the volitional standard in New
York.   The backlash against reform which had begun with M’Naghten had159
finally triumphed in New York. 
The debates within the New York judiciary reflected the debates within and
among courts in other states.  The same ambivalence toward the volitional test
for insanity appears throughout American jurisprudence.  The majority of
states adhered to the intellectual test, and framed it in the terms set forth in
M’Naghten.  This was done throughout the nineteenth century in the federal
courts and in California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maine,
Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina,
Texas, and West Virginia.   Other state courts adopted the volitional test,160
then reverted to the M’Naghten test.  The volitional test controlled in Delaware
until 1990.   Alabama initially adhered to the intellectual test, then adopted161
the volitional test, and finally reverted to the M’Naghten test late in the
century.   Other states that adopted the volitional test for a time in the162
nineteenth century included Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, and
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163. See Fisher v. State, 23 Ill. 283 (1859); Sawyer v. State, 35 Ind. 80, 86-87 (1871); State
v. Felter, 25 Iowa 67, 83-84 (1868); State v. Crawford, 11 Kan. 32, 39 (1873); Scott v.
Commonwealth, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 227, 228-31 (1863); Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264, 266
(1846).
164. Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 729 N.E.2d 252, 255-56 (Mass. 2000).
165. The amount of property transferred annually by this means has not been measured
empirically, but is obviously enormous, and was so in the nineteenth century.  To date, there
is no comprehensive survey of inheritance in America.  The most ambitious effort to date is
CAROLE SHAMMAS, MARYLYNN SALMON & MICHEL DAHLIN, INHERITANCE IN AMERICA: FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1987).  See also Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the
Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1977); Mohr, supra
note 20.
166. Katz, supra note 165, at 11.
167. Id. (citing LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955)).
168. See SHAMMAS ET AL., supra note 165, at 32-34.
169. See People v. Fulton Fire Ins. Co., 25 Wend. 205, 213-16 (N.Y. 1840).
170. Id. at 216 (“Everybody must of necessity, have collateral relatives, unless the line of
his descent from Noah, or that of all his relatives who might otherwise have inherited, has been
broken by alienage or attainder, or crossed by a bar sinister.”).
Pennsylvania.   The volitional test announced in Rogers remains good law163
in Massachusetts some 160 years after it was first articulated by Chief Justice
Shaw.164
IV. Insanity and Will Contests
The transfer of property by last will and testament has not received
scholarly attention in proportion to its cultural and economic importance.165
A comprehensive history of inheritance remains to be written.  The purpose of
this part is not to examine inheritance itself, but to examine insanity in the
context of will contests.  It is worth noting briefly that the terms of inheritance
changed little in this period.  The preference for testamentary transfers to the
spouse and children changed only in the abolition of entail and the shift from
primogeniture to partible inheritance.   These were early developments in the166
colonies that reflected the abundance of land and the decline of feudal habits
of thought.   167
Every American jurisdiction had rules to govern the descent of property
owned by a decedent who died intestate, or whose will was declared invalid.
Whether common law or statutory, these rules provided for the descent of
property to spouses, children, parents, siblings, and siblings’ issue, generally
in that order of preference, and sometimes with some overlap.   Such persons168
were referred to as a class as the “heirs-at-law.”   Typically the law allowed169
even distant cousins to inherit, if closer relatives had not survived.170
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171. Mohr, supra note 20, at 425.
172. Id. at 426; Katz, supra note 165, at 10. 
173. Mohr, supra note 20, at 425.  One important exception is Delafield v. Parish, 25 N.Y.
9 (1862).
174. Parish, 25 N.Y. at 100.
175. See, e.g., Foster v. Foster, 7 Paige Ch. 48 (N.Y. Ch. 1838); In re Dunham, 27 Conn.
192, 204, 208 (1858); American Seaman’s Friend Soc’y v. Hopper, 43 Barb. 625, 625 (N.Y.
Gen. Term 1864), aff’d, 33 N.Y. (6 Tiffany) 619 (1865); Boyd v. Boyd, 66 Pa. 283, 291 (1871).
176. Id.  Compare RYAN, supra note 35, at 146-50, 185.
177. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. 
178. See infra Part IV.B.  At common law, most adults of “sound and disposing mind and
If a will were voided on the grounds of insanity, the estate would be
distributed according to the rules of intestacy.   These rules continued the171
traditional preference that property should remain within the conjugal
family.   As a consequence of these general rules of law, most will contests172
occurred when the heirs-at-law discovered that the terms of the will
disinherited them, or conferred upon them less than the shares they could
expect under the statute of descent.173
A. The “Natural” Objects of the Sane Testator’s Bounty
The legal standard of insanity did change, however, during the first half of
the nineteenth century.  It shifted from the earlier intellectual standard to a
hybrid standard which incorporated both intellectual and sentimental elements.
A testator entirely bereft of reason could not execute a valid will.   That was174
not new.  But in the early nineteenth century a new rule arose, under which a
testator could be found incompetent on the basis of nothing more than
derangement of the sentiments or feelings.   Derangement in this context was175
defined in counterpoint to the idealization of the family underlying the cult of
domesticity and characterizing the middle class.   Thus in cases in which the176
dispositions of property in a will reflected a derangement of the feelings for
the “natural” objects of the testator’s bounty, the courts were far more likely
to hold the testator insane and the will void. More importantly, in certain
circumstances, the new meanings associated with the conjugal family were
extended to protect persons who formed, for the testator, the emotional
equivalent of a family.  Thus as the sentimental ideal insinuated itself into the
common law, the “objects” of the bounty of a testator came to be considered
“natural” because of the emotional relationships they shared, or were presumed
to share with the testator.177
By mid-century this standard was commonly and successfully deployed to
defend the economic interests of the conjugal family, or in some cases, the
relationships which provided the testator or testatrix the emotional support that
was assumed to characterize the conjugal family.   The language the courts178
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memory” could dispose of property by will.  Harrison v. Rowan, 11 F. Cas. 658, 660
(C.C.D.N.J. 1820) (No. 6141).  This was a privilege created by statute, rather than a natural
right.  It was conferred on persons of limited legal competency under nineteenth century law.
The standard of legal competency to make a valid will was lower than the standard of
competency to enter into a contract, Turner v. Cheesman, 15 N.J. Eq. 243, 257 (N.J. Prerog. Ct.
1857); ORDRONAUX, supra note 3, at 354, or to commit a crime.  See In re Dunham, 27 Conn.
192, 204, 208 (1858).  Even so, there were many instances in the official law reports, and no
doubt many more unreported instances, of challenges to wills on the grounds that the testator
was incompetent to make a will due to insanity or mental infirmity.  See Harrison, 11 F. Cas.
at 660-61; Clark v. Fisher, 1 Paige Ch. 171 (N.Y. Ch. 1828); Amos Dean, Unsolved Problems
of the Law, as Embraced in Mental Alienation, 10 AM. L. REG. 513, 517-18 (1862);
ORDRONAUX, supra note 3, at 354-70.
179. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 495, 504 (1823).
180. Id.
181. 6 Wend. 173 (N.Y. 1830).
182. Id. at 175-76.
183. (1790) 163 Eng. Rep. 930, 943 (K.B.).  Lord Kenyon instructed the jury to consider the
testator’s sanity apart from the terms of his will: “You are to consider whether his mind was
entire to make the disposition — not whether the disposition was whimsical, cruel; what none
of you retiring to your own bosoms and collecting your own feelings would have made . . . .”
Id.  The testator in that case disinherited a brother in favor of a cousin.  Id. at 930.  The will was
held valid after protracted proceedings.  Id. at 943.
184. See Bitner v. Bitner, 65 Pa. 347, 359 (1870) (“Wife and children are the natural objects
of a man’s affection and regard, and when they are overlooked in the disposition of the estate,
the reason for doing so may . . . be inquired into.”); Stewart’s Ex’r v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 255,
used to describe the protected family group in such cases was the phrase “the
natural objects of [the testator’s] bounty.”179
That term first appeared in the reported cases in 1823, in Daly’s Lessee v.
James, an opinion by the United States Supreme Court.   Its first appearance180
in New York jurisprudence was in 1830, in Betts v. Jackson.   The Court of181
Errors and Appeals announced that
Wherever a doubt is raised by the evidence as to the mental
capacity of the testator, . . . the reasonableness of the will, in
relation to those who are the natural objects of the testator’s
bounty, is a proper subject for the consideration of the court or jury,
in determining whether it was made by him while in the full
possession of his mental faculties, as a free and voluntary
act . . . .182
This contradicted the English rule announced by Lord Kenyon in the leading
case of Greenwood v. Greenwood.   The term “natural objects of bounty”183
was defined only by example in Betts, but other cases made it clear that it
applied to spouses, children, and, in circumstances discussed below, to other
relatives.184
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275 (N.Y. 1841) (applying the term to the testator's brother-in-law, in whose household she
lived happily until her death); Delafield v. Parish, 25 N.Y. 9, 58-63 (1862) (applying the term
to the testator’s brothers).
185. See Church v. Crocker, 3 Mass. (2 Tyng) 17, 22 (1807); see also Trs. of Dartmouth
Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 passim (1819); Bailey v. Lewis, 3 Day 450, 460, 464 (Conn.
1809); Chew’s Lessee v. Weems, 1 H & McH. 463, 501 (Md. 1772); Clute v. Robison, 2 Johns.
595, 609 (N.Y. 1807); Grasser v. Eckart, 1 Binn. 575, 585 (Pa. 1809); Lewis v. Fisher, 2 Yeates
196, 198 (Pa. 1797); Dill v. Dill, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.) 237, 239, 242 (S.C. Ch. 1791); Selden
v. King, 6 Va. (2 Call) 72, 89-90 (1799).
186. See cases cited supra note 184.
187. See cases cited supra note 184.
188. See Yoe v. McCord, 74 Ill. 33, 39 (1874); American Seaman’s Friend Soc’y v. Hopper,
43 Barb. 625, 625 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1864), aff’d, 33 N.Y. (6 Tiffany) 619 (1865); Bitner, 65 Pa.
at 351, 355, 359.  These cases use the phrase in its normative sense.
189. RYAN, supra note 35, at 154.
190. Id. at 153-79.
191. See, e.g., Christy v. Clarke, 45 Barb. 529, 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 1866).
192. See, e.g., Stewart’s Ex’r v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 255, 256-59 (N.Y. 1841), discussed
The use of the adjective “natural” to modify the phrase “objects of bounty,”
was significant.  Beginning in the 1830s the meaning of the phrase shifted
from being primarily descriptive  to primarily normative.   One of the ways185 186
in which this notion of domesticity was enforced, in the context of the laws
governing the probate of wills, was to define sanity to include, at least
presumptively, assent to this notion.   That trend began with Betts and187
continued throughout the century.188
B. “Natural Objects” Redefined and Expanded
As the social historian Mary Ryan has demonstrated, the conjugal family of
the nineteenth century served more than merely conjugal functions.   In many189
ways, the family was built around emotional relationships and functions which
have, in turn, come to characterize it.   As the cases discussed herein190
illustrate, emotional relatioships became as important as relationships of
consanguinity in defining family relationships.  Where a will was contested,
and the family was disordered or the relationships ambiguous, the matter of
discerning the natural objects of the testator’s bounty became entangled, in the
courts’ opinions, with the issue of insanity, and sometimes with the
reconstruction of idealized notions of family.
In the leading reported cases presenting such problems the appellate courts
sometimes created a “family” of beneficiaries that matched the structure of the
conjugal family.   Where members of the conjugal family, or the nearest191
relatives, had behaved “unnaturally” the courts plumbed the record for a
“family” that served the emotional role of a conjugal family, and identified the
natural objects of bounty accordingly.   The strength of this impulse is192
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193. DALE COCKRELL, DEMONS OF DISORDER: EARLY BLACKFACE MINSTRELS AND THEIR
WORLD 144 (1997); see also INSIDE THE MINSTREL MASK: READINGS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
BLACKFACE MINSTRELSY (Annemarie Bean, James V. Hatch & Brooks McNamara eds., 1996).
194. Christy, 45 Barb. at 530.
195. COCKRELL, supra note 193.
196. Christy, 45 Barb. at 530-31.
197. Id. at 530.
198. Id. at 530-31.
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200. Id. at 530.
201. Id. at 531.
202. Id.
203. Id.
reflected in the lengths the courts went to in order to impose the image of the
emotionally supportive conjugal family on disordered and confused
relationships.
It is hard to imagine a task more imposing than to find order in the family
of Edwin P. Christy, an early promoter of the blackface minstrel shows
popular in the 1840s and 1850s.  The music historian Dale Cockrell has
described Christy as one of the original “demons of disorder,” who made
“blackface minstrelsy” popular in the 1840s and 1850s.   Not a performer193
himself, Christy managed and promoted minstrel shows, and eventually
formed his own troupe in New York City.   After his death in 1862, the194
disputes over his substantial estate exposed the disorder in his emotional and
conjugal life, which the courts were then required to resolve.
Christy was the son of affluent Philadelphia parents.   In 1835 he married195
Harriet Brooks, who had a son named George Harrington.   The couple196
established a home, bought a pew in a church, and had four children
together.   In the early 1840s, Christy took George Harrington to New York197
City, “where he started in business as an Ethiopian or minstrel performer,”
with George as “the principal attraction.”   For years Christy led a dual life,198
maintaining a middle class home in Buffalo and a “meretricious” relationship
in New York City, where he ran his very profitable minstrel show.   Harriet199
moved to New York with the children in 1849.   Edwin moved in with200
Harriet, bought a house for his paramour, Mary Miller, and introduced her to
his children as “Aunt Mary.”201
Harriet’s son quit the show in 1850, took the surname Christy, and
established a competing minstrel troupe.  This created the final rift in the
family.  Edwin refused to support Harriet thereafter, and moved in with
Mary.   He continued to prosper, and by 1859 owned property exceeding two202
hundred thousand dollars in value.   In 1862, in an apparent suicide attempt,203
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he “precipitated himself out a window, landing on his head,” and rendering
himself quadriplegic.   Christy died a few days later, but not before Mary204
found a lawyer to draw a will, under which he left everything to her.   Harriet205
was disinherited, as were Edwin’s surviving children.   Harriet sued,206
claiming the will was invalid as a result of Edwin’s insanity.   Mary defended207
on the grounds that Harriet had never been divorced from her first husband,
Harrington, who was still alive.   There was some plausible evidence that this208
was true.   Had it been, it would have strengthened Mary’s claim.  Harriet’s209
marriage to Edwin would have been void, and Mary would have been
Christy’s widow.  This question and the question of Christy’s sanity were the
critical issues in the case.
The court decided both issues.  It determined that Harriet was the lawful
widow, and that the will was invalid due to Christy’s insanity.  The court
defined sanity in this context as follows: “A disposing mind and memory is a
mind and memory which has the capacity of recollecting, discerning, and
feeling the relations, connections, and obligations of family and blood.”210
With no apparent sense of irony, the court asked a question intended to have
been rhetorical: “What does he [the testator] mean when he refers to his family
and thinks of buying a house for them?  Is it bastard children and a lewd
woman?”  The family was Harriet and their children.  The “blood” relations211
were the children.  The image of domesticity established years before in
Buffalo was the status quo the court would protect, regardless of its sorry
subsequent history.
The appellate courts announced this rule repeatedly, and refined it over
time.  Thus, in American Seaman’s Friend Society v. Hopper,  Charles212
Hopper’s will left his wife a legacy, but gave the bulk of his estate of $100,000
to two charities.   The court expressed concern that the widow’s inheritance,213
while not insubstantial, was “less than we should look for, considering the
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amount of his property and that he left no descendants.”   The court214
invalidated the will on the grounds of insanity, stating:
Had the testator made a natural or usual disposition of his
property, his mental capacity would not have been questioned.  But
the will in this case, disregarding external facts and circumstances
narrated by the witnesses, was unnatural . . . . His mind was
sufficient for the purpose of making a will, unless it was warped or
deluded in respect to the natural objects of his bounty.  215
Similar rules prevailed in other states.  In Bitner v. Bitner  the Supreme216
Court of Pennsylvania, relying on Hopper, held that a testamentary disposition
“which outrages common feeling, and displays a want of ordinary natural
affection” is evidence of insanity.  It affirmed a lower court judgment voiding
a will that had disinherited five of the testator’s eight children.   New Jersey217
and Illinois both extended further protection to the conjugal family by
adopting the rule that “to destroy the capacity of a person to make a will on
account of failure of memory, the failure must be total or extend to his
immediate family.”218
Where a testator had no conjugal family, the court found sanity in a
disposition of property to those persons who had served the emotional role of
a conjugal family in that particular testator’s life.  This is the best explanation
of the result in Stewart’s Executor v. Lispenard,  a case that has confused the219
one medical historian who has written about it.   220
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Alice Lispenard lived the early part of her life in misery.  Thought from her
birth in 1781 to have been an imbecile, Alice was hidden from her father’s
guests, overfed, left uneducated, and permitted from a young age to drink
quantities of strong beer and brandy considered excessive even at that time.221
In his will, Anthony Lispenard wrote “it has pleased Almighty God that my
daughter, Alice, should have such imbecility of mind as to render her
incapable of managing . . . property” and left her with a substantial annuity for
her care.   In addition, as a result of the intestate death of an unmarried222
brother, who left no issue, she inherited in fee an additional share of the
family’s vast wealth.223
After her father’s death, Alice lived with strangers who treated her as her
father had.   In 1827 her sister, Sarah, and brother-in-law, Alexander L.224
Stewart, took her into their home.   Sarah’s inheritance had been greater than225
Alice’s, and Stewart was wealthy in his own right.   They treated her with226
kindness unprecedented in her life.   She progressively abandoned many of227
the behaviors held out as evidence of her imbecility.   When her sister died,228
her brother-in-law kept her in his household on the same kind terms as
before.   By the end of her life she had assumed a role of some small229
responsibility, and considerable affection, in the Stewart household.   The230
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terms of her will made clear her deep love for her brother-in-law, to whom she
left her entire estate.231
Two nieces, the daughters of another deceased brother who had lost his
fortune in speculation, challenged Alice’s will as the product of an
incompetent imbecile.   They presented testimony from persons who had232
known Alice during her early life.   Stewart died before trial, but his executor233
presented testimony from persons who had known Alice during her life in the
Stewart household.   James Campbell, the Surrogate, found Alice234
incompetent.   He clearly believed her imbecility was inflicted by God,235
stating that “her Creator for inscrutable ends had withheld, an understanding
capable of receiving instruction.”   Imbecility, being a divinely inflicted236
condition, was not subject to cure, in the opinion of Surrogate Campbell.  The
Circuit Judge affirmed on appeal, and the Chancellor affirmed the Circuit
Judge.   237
The New York Court for the Correction of Errors reversed.   The Senators238
were clearly impressed by the change in Alice from her early to her final days.
Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that Alice, even toward the end, lacked
average intelligence, and could probably be characterized as weak-minded.239
The court also noted “the natural and legitimate affections of gratitude and
attachment to those with whom she had long lived, and who had deserved it
by long and persevering care and kindness.”   Reliance on such “evidence of240
affection” was “usual and proper” in cases in which testamentary capacity
might otherwise be questioned.   This was sufficient in the court’s opinion241
to support its finding that Alice had a mind sufficiently “sound and disposing”
to know the natural objects of her bounty, and to make a legally valid will.242
The court ordered the will admitted to probate.   Alice’s fortune went to those243
persons who had provided her with the emotional support denied her by her
nearer relatives.  The Stewarts had, in an emotional sense, become Alice’s only
family. By its implicit definition of sanity, the Lispenard case illustrates the
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influence of the sentimental and domestic ideals on the medical jurisprudence
of the era.
The sentimental standard of insanity more commonly led to the invalidating
of wills that surely would have been admitted to probate under Lord Kenyon’s
rule in Greenwood v. Greenwood.   But that does not mean that the American244
courts intended to abolish, in effect,  the right of free testamentary disposition.
As one New York judge noted in 1869, in an opinion upholding the
disinheritance of an abusive husband by his wealthy wife, “[a] wife may fear
and hate her husband excessively, without being crazy.”   Disinheritance was245
most likely to be upheld when the natural objects themselves had behaved
unnaturally toward the testator.  Thus, in Foster v. Foster,  the court upheld246
the disinheritance of the testator’s daughters.   The testator had left247
everything to his wife, who was not the daughters’ mother.  The record
indicated that the daughters and their husbands had interfered in the testator’s
domestic affairs and generally treated him badly, in a manner the court
denounced as unnatural.   In In re Dunham,  the disinherited sisters of Lucy248 249
Kelsey, who were her heirs-at-law, challenged her will and requested that the
trial court instruct the jury as follows:
That if the testatrix harbored an unreasonable antipathy to her
sisters, not justly caused by any acts of unkindness or improper
conduct on their part, and had no reasonable evidence of such
unkindness or improper conduct, this would be a delusion and
would constitute unsoundness of mind; and her will, made during
the existence of such delusion, would be void.250
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut explicitly approved this as an
accurate statement of law.   Yet in the same case the court disapproved an251
instruction that the same delusion would render the testatrix insane for every
purpose.   It is entirely clear that, whatever her testamentary capacity, Lucy252
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Kelsey could not have been found insane for purposes of the criminal law.  In
her case, the jury found that she had reason for her antipathy toward her
sisters, that “her sisters had treated her with continued neglect and unkindness,
and so had their husbands and family connexions, and that she had received
many wrongs and injuries at their hands.”    The judges reaffirmed the rule253
that anyone who deviated too far from the “natural” pattern of testamentary
giving, by that very deviation gave evidence of mental defect, and risked
having his or her will voided on the grounds of insanity.   Kelsey’s sisters’254
conduct removed them from the category of natural objects of her bounty.  The
court found Kelsey sane, and approved the will that disinherited the sisters.255
Testamentary favoritism toward one or more of the natural objects of
bounty was upheld in cases in which the others were not wholly disinherited,
particularly where evidence indicated disproportionate inter vivos gifts to the
disadvantaged heirs.   Large testamentary gifts to non-relatives, or more256
distant relatives, were not necessarily problematic in the eyes of the law.  A
gift to a non-relative was upheld in Marx v. McGlynn.   The court examined257
the terms of the will, including the non-family gift, and found them reasonable.
“[T]he will is not unnatural or unjust, fair provision being made for those who
would naturally be the heirs.”258
There is little by way of a historiography of insanity in will contests.  The
only article dealing directly with the topic is by the historian James C. Mohr.259
Mohr uses Lispenard  and Delafield v. Parish,  another high-profile New260 261
York case, to illustrate the abrogation and reinstatement of a rule which he
implies was an intellectual standard.   Unfortunately, Professor Mohr relies262
exclusively upon contemporary secondary sources, and does not even cite the
courts’ opinions in the cases he discusses.  As discussed at length herein,
Lispenard illustrates the means by which the law supported normative notions
of middle class family structure and domesticity in will contests.  The other
case, Parish, presented a fairly obvious case of fraud by the wife in an attempt
to disinherit the testator’s brothers.   It is otherwise consistent with the263
explanation of testamentary insanity rules offered here.
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“Henry Parish . . . was a wealthy and respectable New York merchant, of
competent education and high intelligence.”   Childless at his death in 1856,264
he left an estate of well over $1,100,000.   He had executed a will in 1842,265
which provided handsomely for his wife, provided substantial gifts to his
brothers, sisters, and a cousin, and named one of his brothers executor.   A266
number of his wife’s relatives were to receive specific legacies, as were a
number of Parish’s more distant relatives.267
In 1849 Parish suffered a severe stroke, which paralyzed his right side.268
He never regained the ability to move his right side, speak, read, or write.269
Forty days after his stroke, a codicil was attached to his will.   Two others270
were added over the next five years.   These were all dictated by his wife to271
an attorney other than the one who had prepared Parish’s will of 1842.   The272
overall effect of these was, first, to make specific bequests to his wife of
property that had been left in the will to his brothers, and to revoke the one
brother’s executorship.   The major issue in the case was whether Parish was273
legally competent to execute the codicils.   If he was not, then the will of274
1842 would remain in effect.   In that sense the case was atypical, because275
the challenge was intended to restore the will by voiding the codicils.
The standard the court applied had an intellectual as well as a sentimental
element:
[A] disposing mind and memory is a mind and memory which has
the capacity of recollecting, discerning, and feeling the relations,
connections, and obligations of family and blood . . . .  We have
held that it is essential that the testator has [sic] sufficient capacity
to comprehend perfectly the condition of his property, his relations
to the persons who were, or should, or might have been the objects
of his bounty, and the scope and bearing of the provisions of his
will.276
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss3/2
2005] INSANITY IN TESTATORS AND CRIMINALS 435
277. Christy v. Clarke, 45 Barb. 529 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1866); Stewart’s Ex’r v. Lispenard,
26 Wend. 255 (N.Y. 1841).
278. Parish, 25 N.Y. at 18.
279. Id. at 17.
280. Id. at 18.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 19.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 35.
Thus the rule applied was the same rule in effect for thirty years, which was
also applied in Lispenard and Christy.277
The Parish court observed that, under the will of 1842, nearly two-thirds of
Parish’s enormous estate went to his wife and other members of her family.278
This amounted to over $700,000 in 1862.   Of this the court observed:279
His solicitude, in the first place, to make ample provision for his
wife, is clearly apparent from the testimony of [the attorney who
prepared the 1842 will].  He was not only desirous of securing her
such a portion of his estate as would enable her to maintain her
established position in society, and supply to her all the wants and
luxuries to which she had been accustomed, but he was also
anxious that the provision should be so ample that a carping and
fault-finding world should so esteem it.280
A substantial portion of the remaining third of the estate was to go to his
brothers under the 1842 will.   Of these gifts the court observed: “Their281
portion of his estate, he must have seen, would be munificent, and such as
brothers in these circumstances would naturally expect from a wealthy brother,
dying without issue, after making ample provision for his widow.”   Clearly,282
the enormous size of the estate gave rise to a different set of expectations and
an expanded set of “natural” objects of his bounty, including his brothers.
That was the standard against which Henry Parish’s will, and the contested
codicils, were measured.   For those reasons, the case is consistent with an283
expanded domestic ideal, including siblings.  To that extent it is not perfectly
representative of broader trends in the adjudication of will contests, but it
surely does not contradict them.
Perhaps more importantly in this case, the court’s opinion betrays serious
concerns that Parish’s wife had simply worked a fraud to disinherit her
husband’s brothers.  The court commented that the codicils were exclusively
for Mrs. Parish’s benefit, that “they were drawn up at her suggestion, upon her
procurement, and by counsel employed by her.”   Such circumstances “ought284
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generally to excite the suspicion of the court.”   The court noted that, under285
the civil law in effect in Europe, such a codicil would have been void as a
matter of law, without further inquiry, “and it may be well doubted whether we
have acted wisely in departing from [the civil law’s] just and rational
provisions in this respect.”   The Parish case must be seen as atypical286
because the size of the estate created unusual expectations and expanded the
class of natural objects of Parish’s bounty.  Perhaps more importantly, it was
a case of clear, if not simple fraud, and for both reasons lacks the historical
significance Professor Mohr has placed upon it.
Common law courts in the United States had a clear agenda to protect
families, or their emotional equivalents, from being disinherited during the
nineteenth century, whether by unnatural wills or by challenges brought by
undeserving heirs-at-law.  Where necessary, the courts did not hesitate to
create a conjugal family out of a chaotic group of relationships, as illustrated
by the Christy case.   Where no conjugal family could be located, the courts287
protected the nearest equivalent of the conjugal family by protecting that
constellation of relationships which had provided the testator with the same
emotional support expected from an ideal conjugal family, as in the Lispenard
case.  Where a testator’s treatment of his or her family during life was
unnatural, and the unnatural treatment continued in the terms of the will, the
courts did not hesitate to protect the family.  And finally, where the family had
treated the testator unnaturally, the courts permitted the testator to disinherit
that family, or portions of it.  In those circumstances, sanity did not require
recognition of family obligations.
V. Conclusion
The contrast between judicial treatment of insanity in criminal prosecutions
on the one hand and will contests on the other illustrates the law’s resistance,
and partial yielding, to the sentimentalizing trend in nineteenth century
American culture.  To the extent that ideas about personhood were implicit in
the jurisprudence of insanity, it appears that personhood was fragmented and
contested.  The fact that the debate was consistently framed in the terms of
faculty psychology suggests that fragmentation was thought to be a
fundamental characteristic of mind and therefore of personhood. This
assumption was widely accepted in the legal literature throughout the century.
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Persons were assembled of discrete parts, any one of which could be defective,
or could malfunction temporarily.288
In the particular context of the criminal law, most judges and physicians
held tightly to the older, intellectual standard of insanity.  The reform
movement, expressed specifically in this context in the work of Isaac Ray,
Charles Doe, John Edmonds, and Lemuel Shaw, made a strong challenge at
mid-century.  But its adherents were dismissed as “visionary theorists and
sentimental philosophers,”  and their position was ultimately rejected by289
century’s end.  It remained thereafter a small minority view. 
When insanity was raised to attack the testamentary capacity of a decedent
who had disinherited the natural objects of his or her bounty, the courts took
a very different approach, based on a different faculty of mind.  They
incorporated in the standard of sanity the ability to feel the obligations of
family.  This standard relied upon the notion that there was a proper
configuration of feelings, the absence of which could render a person insane,
or invalidate the will of a person otherwise sane.  Persons who were clearly
sane for purposes of the criminal law might be insane under this standard.  The
natural objects could be disinherited if they had behaved toward the testator
in a manner deemed unnatural.  This typically involved conduct that violated
the obligations of affection and kindness that also characterized the emotional
function of the middle class family.  In such circumstances, where the natural
objects had violated the domestic ideal of the family, the testator’s action
appeared justifiable, and therefore sane. 
Sentimentalism, the cult of domesticity, the jurisprudence of the heart,
whatever one might call the cultural imperative underlying the law of insanity
in wills, triumphed in this area of nineteenth century law.  But its triumph was
incomplete, and the law remained divided over the role of sentiment and
emotion in the configuration of legal rights and responsibilities, and the
definition of full and competent legal personhood.
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